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Changes in the Policing of Civil
Disorders Since the Kerner
Report: The Police Response to
Ferguson, August 2014, and
Some Implications for the
Twenty-First Century
Pat r ick F. Gillh a m a n d G a ry T. M a r x
The Kerner Commission identified factors contributing to police ineffectiveness during the 1960s civil disorders. Since release of the Kerner report, the frequency and intensity of civil disorders has declined and the
policing of disorders has changed. Using the report recommendations as a framework, we analyze changes
in police disorder management during the 2014 events in Ferguson as these involve operational planning
and equipment. Data for the Ferguson case are constructed from media reports, police and activist accounts,
after action reports, and field observations. We link changes seen in Ferguson to larger institutional changes
in law enforcement over the last fifty years. We conclude with discussions on what did and did not work in
the policing of Ferguson and highlight implications for policing of protest and disorder in the twenty-first
century.
Keywords: Kerner Commission, National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, democratic policing,
protest, riots, Ferguson

Police departments have become more adept
at handling potential riot situations. While
riot potentials were greater in 1968 than in
1967, the triggering events were rapidly controlled and large-scale disorders thus were
avoided.
—Urban America 1969

It is our hope that the lessons learned in Ferguson will provide guidance to . . . police departments around the country and will prepare
these agencies to respond effectively and constitutionally to the challenges of mass demonstrations in the 21st century. [emphasis added]
—Institute for Intergovernmental
Research 2015
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t he policing of ci v il disor ders

Police were a central factor in the 1967 disorders studied by the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission, thus the Kerner report [1968]). The
commission’s “Supplement on Control of Disorder” considered problems related to operational planning, logistical needs, training, control equipment, coordination, and legal needs.
We use some of their 1968 recommendations
as the framework to contrast police behavior
then and now. For the contemporary period,
we consider the policing of protests that
emerged with a case study of Ferguson, Missouri, following the police killing of Michael
Brown.
The Ferguson protests and disorder and the
overwhelming police response to this social
unrest provide a reminder that, more than any
other institution, police symbolize the American racial order. Despite improvement in some
areas, the combustible mix that led to the 1960s
disorders is still here. Police remain the fulcrum for accumulated grievances.
In the 1960s, incidents (and sometimes rumors) of police violence were most often what
drew protesters, rioting protesters, and opportunistic rioters to the streets. Once on the
street, police responses were a central factor in
whether violence escalated. In 1967 police action could often be described as too much too
soon or too little too late. Sometimes there were
two riots—the police and those they sought to
control. Other factors include instances of firecrackers being heard as gunshots, of police
mistakenly firing at each other, of police covering their badges; and of leadership, equipment,
strategic, and logistical failures that limited effectiveness and increased anger on all sides
(Marx 1971a). This article explores how the policing of civil disorders in a context of protest
has changed since the 1960s.
We begin with a consideration of factors relevant to the relative absence of the large-scale
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disorders since the 1960s. Paralleling changes
in the forms of disorder, we note a shift by researchers to study the policing of disorders as
a factor more broadly tied to efforts to control
social movements and protest. Then, we review
several problems with the policing of disorders
identified by the Kerner Commission and the
commission’s recommendations to mitigate
them. We use the case of Ferguson in 2014 to
illustrate significant changes in the policing of
protests since Kerner. We consider three central
questions: What changes in the policing of protest and civil disorder are most noticeable since
Kerner? What police practices “worked” in Ferguson and what practices did not? What are
implications for the twenty-first century?
T h e A b e ya n c e o f L a r g e -
Sc a le C i v i l D i s o r d e r s

We have in general not seen a repeat of the
massive state violence in response to crowd
situations that was responsible for hundreds
of deaths in the 1960s (Tilly 2003). Even the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. did not
lead to extended and continued rioting beyond
the initial outbursts, nor was it as heavy handed
a police response as in previous times.1 The decline in the frequency of civil disorders has
been documented (Olzak and Shanahan 1996;
Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney 1996; Gooden
and Myers 2018; Bentley-Edwards et al. 2018),
but little research has been undertaken on reasons for the decline and on changes in policing
of disorders. Since the 1970s, scholars have
shifted their focus away from disorders as such
and toward the policing of social movements
and protest events (see, for example, Marx
1970a, 1988; della Porta and Reiter 1998; Earl,
Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Vitale 2005; della
Porta, Peterson, and Reiter 2006; Waddington
2007; Soule and Davenport 2009; Earl 2011;
Starr, Fernandez, and Scholl 2011; Gillham, Edwards, and Noakes 2013; Wood 2014). This shift

1. The Kerner report with its call for improved police responses appeared shortly before King’s death. Yet independent of the Kerner report awareness had increased within law enforcement of the need to avoid the kinds of
failures seen in Detroit, Newark, and Watts. This statement is of course relative to American history, internationally and since the 1960s. Examples of post-1960s failures in policing of civil disorders include the 1979 Greensboro massacre, the 1980 Miami race–McDuffie riots, and the six-day Rodney King riots in Los Angeles in 1992
(Moore 2012; Webster and William 1992).
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away from studying civil disorders is no doubt
related to their relative absence. Relevant factors in the decline likely include improved ways
for filing grievances against police, the spread
of civilian review boards, greater court receptiveness to police liability cases, and establishment of protest permitting systems (McCarthy
and McPhail 1998; McPhail, Schweingruber,
and McCarthy 1998; Schneider 2014).2 Yet, as
many of the articles in this issue suggest, the
racial injustices seen by the commission persist
and in some ways have been worsened by the
devastating impacts of the war on drugs (Alexander 2011; Oliver 2008).
Va ry i n g Po li c e R e s p o n s e s to
P r ot e s t a n d D i s o r d e r s

Given the contemporary saliency of protests
and the fact that disorders often ignite from
protest events (such as Ferguson, Baltimore,
Standing Rock, and Charlottesville), for this article we draw on scholarship from the policing
of social movements and protest events to theorize the changes in policing of civil disorders.
By civil disorders, we mean larger scale, disruptive, public events directed at a dominant social
order that can include acts of civil disobedience
and direct action, confrontations with law enforcement and counter protesters, and behavior such as looting, arson, and physical violence
(Body-Gendrot 2017). Collective and individual
acts that occur during civil disorders involve
violence rituals, coordinated destruction, and
opportunism whether directed at commodities,
competing groups, or both (Tilly 2003; Waddington 2007). Our definition recognizes that
such actions may represent political acts seen
as being of last resort (Hobsbawm 1964; Piven
and Cloward 1979). Whether police view crowd
behavior as protest or crime has important implications for where responses fall on a con-

tinuum moving from communication to coercion (Earl and Soule 2006; Wood 2007).
Contemporary research on the U.S. policing
of protest and disorderly events has focused
primarily on national special security events
(such as G20 meetings), disruptive protest
events extensively covered by the media (such
as Occupy Wall Street), and on policing in large
metro areas like New York City and Washington, D.C., where protests are routine (Gillham
and Marx 2000; Vitale 2005, 2007; Fernandez
2008; Starr, Fernandez, and Scholl 2011; Gillham, Edwards, and Noakes 2013; Wood 2014;
King 2017). This research finds that the policing
of protest and disorder has changed dramatically since the 1960s, although scholars debate
whether the changes are driven more by innovations in police behavior or by changes in protest tactics (Earl 2011).
Police actions can facilitate, channel, or repress protests (Marx 1988; Earl 2003). During
the 1950s and 1960s cycles of protest, police applied escalating levels of force to prevent or
constrain protests and disorders (McCarthy
and McPhail 1998). Such actions could result
in on-the-job troubles such as injuries, deaths,
and property damage, and in-the-job troubles
such as public criticism, commissions, and
pressure from political elites (Walker 1968;
Waddington 1994).
In the aftermath of the Kerner Commission
and others (such as the Violence Commission)
researchers noted the development of a less
confrontational approach by leading law enforcement agencies that emphasized negotiating with protesters the time, manner, and place
of demonstrations. Adopted first in Washington, D.C., in the early 1980s, the negotiated management style of protest policing developed
around an event permitting process, which in
turn led to increased communication and co-

2. Just how independent, transparent, and effective current methods are is a different question, but the presence
of these mechanisms, however imperfect, matters. In addition, when disorders occur they are likely to receive
more balanced attention in the mass media and from the Justice Department than fifty years ago. Other possible factors for the abeyance of disorders include the appearance of stronger neighborhood, local community
and professionalized national and other nongovernmental organizations (Noakes and Gillham 2006), and moves
toward community policing, or at least greater receptiveness to community concerns. Finally, just as the war on
drugs has devastated many minority communities by moving many black males younger than thirty into prison
or placing them under some type of judicial supervision, this “war” has also removed potential participants from
the pool of people who could participate in social movements and other forms of political activity (Oliver 2008).
r sf: t he russell sage f ou n dat ion jou r na l of t he so ci a l sciences
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operation between police and protesters and
an extended period of calm (McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy 1998; McCarthy,
McPhail, and Crist 1999). Yet, since the disruptive World Trade Organization protests in Seattle in 1999 police-protester relations have
been frequently more adversarial. Trust, cooperation, and communication have declined on
both sides as police sought to incapacitate protest and activists resisted such efforts (Noakes,
Klocke, and Gillham 2005; Vitale 2005, 2007;
Gillham and Noakes 2007; Gillham 2011; King
2017).
These changes are noticeable relative to the
1960s. Drawing on media reports, police and
activist accounts, official after-action reports,
and our direct field observations from August
16 through August 18, we analyze policing of
the 2014 Ferguson Missouri protests and disorder that developed. The Ferguson case is important because it provides an opportunity to
study an infrequent occurrence of civil disorder
and law enforcement’s response, and illustrates
some broader national changes seen in many
law enforcement agencies since the release of
the Kerner report.
Kerner Findings

Among problems identified by the Kerner Commission were those involving operational planning and police control equipment (see table
1). The first set of operational planning problems
involved weaknesses in the dispatch-oriented
command and control structure for policing
disorders (Kerner Report 1968, 268). In the
1960s, departments used a dispatch-driven
command and control system according to
which orders were delivered from a central location via car radio to line officers on patrol.
Officers responding to the scene of a crowd incident radioed back to dispatch for help to disperse the crowd. Yet, when supporting officers
arrived at the scene, their presence and actions
could increase tensions among those already
angry and distrustful of police. Because radios
were anchored to the patrol vehicle, officers at
the scene were unable to easily communicate
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with commanders at headquarters. By the time
commanders realized they and additional officers were needed on-site, it was often too late
as disorder rapidly spread and escalated, as was
the case in Detroit, Milwaukee, and Newark
(Kerner Report 1968).
After a large-scale disorder was under way,
police often had difficulty communicating with
each other because they did not have radios on
their person and no special radio frequencies
had been established to handle the additional
radio traffic associated with the disorder response. Many departments did not have adequate organizational and technical means to
communicate either with police in neighboring
jurisdictions or with state police and sheriff departments. When other law enforcement agencies were present, their radio frequencies were
frequently incompatible, making it difficult to
respond quickly in an organized way (Kerner
Report 1968, 269).
To mitigate these command and control
troubles, the commission recommended that,
first, a model operational plan providing guidelines for responding to incidents and civil disorders developed by the commission be distributed to all police departments;3 second, the
federal government fund the development of
miniaturized and portable radios for law enforcement; and, third, the Federal Communications Commission make enough frequencies
available to police and other first responders
(Kerner Report 1968, 269–70).
The second set of operational planning
problems involved the lack of information or
intelligence available to police about the planning of protests and disorder events, and about
disorder events once they started (Kerner Report 1968, 172–73, 269). The commission noted
that many departments had little understanding about the causes of unrest within primarily
black urban areas, had poor relations with people living in these segregated neighborhoods,
and generally lacked reliable means for gathering information about looming civil unrest. The
lack of broad understanding, poor relations,
and relevant pre-disorder information pre-

3. The plan was integrated into a larger Guidelines for Civil Disorder and Mobilization Planning prepared by the
Research, Development and Planning Division of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (Smith and
Kobetz 1968). It was released six months after the Kerner report.
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Table 1. Kerner Findings: Mismanagement Factors, Problems, and Recommendations Related to
Operational Planning and Police Equipment
Mismanagement
Factor
Operational
planning

Police equipment

Problems

Recommendation

Dispatch driven command and control
system provides insufficient structure
for responding to incidents and civil
disorders
Line officer radios located in patrol
vehicle. Thus, cannot communicate
with dispatch unless in vehicle
No special radio frequency available to
use for public order emergencies;
limited means to communicate with
neighboring law enforcement
agencies; neighboring agencies used
incompatible radio frequencies
Limited information gathered before
and during civil disorder. Thus,
unable to make reliable assessment
and decisions in the field and unable
to counter rumors

Police need operational plans that
provide guidelines for responding to
incidents and civil disorders

Minimal self-protection equipment
available for frontline officers
resulting in officer injury
Batons and hand guns, the primary
control tools available for local law
enforcement, are insufficient for
responding to civil disorders

Provide proper equipment and clothing
to protect against threat to bodily
harm
Federal government should initiate
program to test and evaluate
nonlethal weapons for use by police,
provide support to develop national
standards to stimulate the private
sector to produce these weapons,
and direct funds to develop these
weapons for local and state law
enforcement agencies

Federal government should initiate and
fund portable radio development
programs
FCC should make enough frequencies
available to police and related public
safety services to meet needs for
public order emergencies

Develop intelligence units to gather,
evaluate, analyze, and disseminate
information about potential and
actual civil disorders

Source: Authors’ tabulations.

vented police from preparing adequately. Moreover, once civil disorders erupted, police had
limited skills and methods for gathering information. This made responding to rumors difficult. Furthermore, few formal ways to disseminate accurate information about an incident
or disorder were in place, leaving rumors and
media to shape the public’s view of events. The
commission recommended that police develop
intelligence units to gather, evaluate, analyze,
and disseminate information about potential
civil disorders and during civil disorders (269).
Another set of problems identified involved

police protective and control equipment. Most
police departments did not provide officers adequate self-protection equipment against rocks,
bottles, and other projectiles. Wooden batons
and service revolvers were the primary methods
of control (Kerner Report 1968, 176). The commission questioned the justification for using
deadly force during civil disorders, noting the
risk of killing or wounding innocent people,
that the property crimes committed during disorder events did not warrant the use of lethal
force, and that excessive force (including the
inappropriate display of weapons) could pro-
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voke further disorder. The commission saw a
need for control tools in the “middle range of
physical force” that could be used “more humanely” and effectively for regular policing and
during times of unrest (176).
The commission recommended that the federal government undertake a program to test
and evaluate “nonlethal” weapons for use by
police, provide support “to establish criteria
and standards specifications to stimulate [private industry to produce] such items,” and direct funds “to be used to develop appropriate
tools . . . for local and state law enforcement
agencies (Kerner Report 1968, 272). The commission further warned against militarizing local police because doing so risked “destroy[ing]
the concept of civilian police as a public service
agency dependent for effective operations on
community cooperation and support” (272).
We next compare the commission’s recommendations with what we saw in Ferguson to
illustrate changes in the policing of disorder.
The contrast between policing of the 1960s and
today is clear, just as are commonalities. Although many factors are involved, the changes
in law enforcement seen in the illustrative case
study that follows are consistent with the basic
thrust of the Kerner recommendations and certainly had an important impact.
T r a n s f o r m at i o n i n t h e
Po li c i n g o f D i s o r d e r

We next consider key events in Ferguson over
the sixteen days between the killing of Michael
Brown and his funeral. We then use the Ferguson case to highlight changes in police operational planning and equipment since Kerner
and note some institutional forces contributing
to these changes.
The Ferguson Case (August 9–
August 25, 2014)

On August 9, shortly after noon, a Ferguson
police officer shot and killed eighteen-year-old
Michael Brown, an unarmed African American
man. Backup officers from the Ferguson Police
Department (PD) and the St. Louis County Police Department (SLCPD) rushed to the scene
and pushed back an agitated crowd that had
gathered. Officers reported an increasingly chaotic scene, with some crowd members making
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death threats to police and shots being fired
nearby. In response, the SLCPD deployed their
Tactical Operations Unit, then initiated the
county’s Code 1000 Plan, which mobilized aid
from neighboring police departments and activated the Riot A Channel for exclusive communication between responding law enforcement agencies (IIR 2015, 5–9). More than fifty
officers from multiple agencies quickly arrived
and staged at two nearby locations. Crowds
continued to grow at the homicide scene and
formed at the police staging areas and outside
the Ferguson PD headquarters. Protests continued at these locations until early morning
August 10 (10–11).
Mid-morning of August 10, crowds reassembled around the city. In response, SLCPD and
Ferguson police chiefs established an “informal joint command” within the Ferguson PD
headquarters and used the Code 1000 plan to
request more officers from surrounding jurisdictions. After an evening candle-light vigil at
the site of the shooting, angry protesters surged
into streets chanting “no justice, no peace.”
They were met by police in riot gear holding
rifles and shields (New York Times 2014). After
this confrontation, the first civil disorder began
when several protesters vandalized police vehicles, damaged property, and looted businesses along West Florissant Avenue (Barker
2014). Police deployed armored vehicles and
canine units to protect officers from thrown
projectiles and more reported gun fire.
The SLCPD chief took charge as incident
commander and extended the Code 1000 Plan
by initiating a formal Incident Command System (ICS) framework. The ICS, an organizational framework first developed by FEMA and
adopted nationally by first responders, is “a
standardized personnel management tool” that
establishes an integrated organizational command and control framework which designates
an incident commander to manage all personnel and make critical decisions (Bigley and
Roberts 2001; St. Louis County 2013, 6). As part
of the ICS police established an official command post in a mall on West Florissant Avenue.
After allegedly giving dispersal orders, tactical
teams fired smoke canisters and tear gas, pushing protesters and looters north into the town
of Dellwood. That night, police made thirty-t wo
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arrests (Barker 2014; Giegerich, Bogan, and Bell
2014; Institute for Intergovernmental Research
2015, 11–15).
Over the next several days, a similar cycle
persisted of peaceful protests during the daytime and a mix of peaceful, unruly, and illegal
actions during the night. According to police
reports, at night some citizens looted and
burned businesses, threw Molotov cocktails
and other projectiles at police lines, fired guns,
and destroyed civilian and police vehicles. Police forcefully responded by driving armored
vehicles into the streets, deploying tear gas and
other less-lethal weapons, and making arrests
(IIR 2015, 15–17, 58).
As news of the unrest spread through conventional media and social media outlets, police intelligence reports indicated that people
from across the region and country had begun
arriving in Ferguson, some to protest and others with intent to exploit opportunities for personal gain (IIR 2015, 18, 58). Local, county, and
state political leaders, frustrated by the increased disorder and negative media attention
wanted the incident commander replaced. On
August 14, Governor Nixon responded by declaring a state of emergency and making Missouri State Highway Patrol Captain Johnson,
an African American, incident commander.
Protester and police interactions were calmer
that night, perhaps because of the governor’s
action (20).
The calm, though, was short lived. On August 15, the Ferguson Police Department identified Darren Wilson as the officer who had
killed Michael Brown and released a surveillance video showing that Brown had allegedly
stolen a package of cigars from a convenience
store shortly before he was stopped by Wilson.
A later unedited version of the video indicated
that Brown may not have stolen the cigars
(Smith 2017). Hundreds of people assembled
outside the Ferguson Police Department headquarters to condemn release of the video, seen
by many in the community as a ploy to demonize Brown and justify the shooting. Like previous nights, people again engaged in rioting and
looting while peaceful protesters looked on.
This time, police stood by choosing not to act
out of concern they would only make things
worse (IIR 2015, 21–23).

August 16, Governor Nixon declared a state
of emergency and imposed a midnight to 5:00
a.m. curfew. In the streets, officers with helmets, face protectors, gas masks, riot batons,
shields, and Kevlar vests formed lines separating people on the streets and sidewalks from
local businesses. Tactical teams in full battle
gear moved small groups of people around the
streets and sidewalks and stood guard at roadblocks. That night police again used armored
vehicles, lines of officers, less-lethal weapons,
and arrests to disperse crowds (IIR 2015, 24–25).
On the evening of August 17, police reported
that a large crowd attempted to overtake the
command post. It is unclear whether this was
the intent of those in the crowd or they had assembled simply to protest police actions or the
curfew order. Police dispatched a helicopter to
provide overhead surveillance and a line of officers led by SWAT units used smoke bombs,
tear gas, and other less-lethal weapons to move
the crowd back north on West Florissant Avenue. Several businesses were looted and a brawl
between 150 people broke out. As the chaos increased, all police teams were pulled back in
hope to diffuse the anger of people in the
streets. But the disorder raged on as the most
violent night of unrest yet. The next day, Governor Nixon lifted the curfew and ordered the
National Guard to protect the command post,
freeing up police officers to help with disorder
control (IIR 2015, 26–28).
August 19 was a turning point. Hostile interactions continued between protesters and police, but less rioting, property damage, and
shots fired were reported. Over the next several
days “a calm began to emerge”—as fewer people protested and less anger was exhibited (IIR
2015, 28). On August 21, the governor ordered
the Missouri National Guard to withdraw from
Ferguson. By August 24, police report that protest had continued to decrease in size and “a
sense of normalcy was returning.” On August
25, Michael Brown was laid to rest. At his father’s request, no protests occurred during the
funeral (IIR 2015, 28–29).
Fifty Years After Kerner

We use the Ferguson case to consider our first
major question: What has changed in the policing of protest and civil disorder since the
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Table 2. Police Command and Control System, Intelligence Practices, and Protective and Control
Equipment During Disorders in the 1960s and in Ferguson in 2014
1960s
Command and
control system

Intelligence
practices

Ferguson

Dispatch driven
No special radio frequency for
emergencies
Radios located in patrol vehicles
incompatible with radios used by
neighboring jurisdictions
No formal intelligence units in
most PDs

Limited information gathered before
civil disorder
Limited information gathered during
civil disorder

Self-protection
equipment

Minimal self-protection available

Control
equipment

Baton and guns

Code 1000 Plan and ICS
RIOT A radio frequencies
Vehicle and portable radios, cell
phones, and text messaging across
command chain
Joint intelligence unit formed from
SLCPD, SLMPD, SL Fusion Center;
assistance from MO Info Analysis
Center
No information gathered before civil
disorder
Event data collected by intel unit in
static and real time via undercover
officers, officers in streets, permits,
aircraft, police video-streaming, social
media monitoring
Information about outside protest
groups collected by intel unit; relied
on cross-national diverse intelligence
information systems including fusion
centers
Helmets, gas masks, Kevlar vests, and
shields (line officers and tactical units)
Military grade body armor, battle dress,
and armored vehicles (tactical units)
Less-lethal weapons to disperse and
incapacitate, such as impact,
acoustic, and chemical irritants (line
officers and tactical units)
Armored vehicles and displayed
military firepower to deter and
intimidate (tactical units)

Source: Authors’ tabulations.

Kerner report? We limit our analysis to changes
in police operational planning related to command and control and the gathering and analysis of intelligence, and police equipment used
(see table 2). After highlighting some of these
changes, we identify institutional forces that
have contributed to the changes.
Command and Control in Ferguson
Commanders’ abilities to quickly receive assistance from other agencies and to communicate

effectively across the chain of command has
improved significantly since Kerner. For many
years, St. Louis County has had a Code 1000
Plan that aides nearby agencies in planning
and control for civil disorders and disasters (St.
Louis County 2013). When activated on August
9, the nearest twenty-five police cars from various jurisdictions were immediately dispatched
to the homicide scene along with a crowd-
control mobile response team. Other officers
self-deployed when they heard the Code 1000
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request (Belmar and Kleinknecht 2016; IIR
2015). Besides providing a mechanism to
promptly mobilize mutual aid, the Code 1000
Plan also provided a framework for managing
personnel during the early hours of the crises.
For example, for each five officers that responded to the Code 1000 request, a commanding officer was deployed. The commanding officer then made decisions in the field and
communicated with the SLCPD chief who had
initiated the Code 1000 (IIR 2015).
Once it became clear that the civil disorder
would not quickly dissipate, law enforcement
officials initiated an ICS framework, which formally designated the incident commander and
required establishment of an operations command post and lines of communication across
the ICS chain of command, designated an operations officer to coordinate tactical operations and a public information officer to communicate to the media and community,
established law enforcement staging areas, and
assigned support staff (St. Louis County 2013,
6; Bigley and Roberts 2001; FEMA 2013). Reliance on such extensive and versatile operational guidelines as provided by the Code 1000
Plan and ICS framework indicates an organizational shift in law enforcement’s command
and control structure far beyond what the
Kerner Commission envisioned.
Relatedly, communication technologies
have of course changed dramatically since
Kerner. Police agencies now have access to portable radios on the same frequencies as vehicle
radios and as radios in other jurisdictions. In
Ferguson, the county dispatcher could contact
agencies needed to respond to the initial call
for assistance and special RIOT channels were
available. Most radios synced well, despite interoperability issues still common elsewhere
(IIR 2015; Weiser 2007). When there were failures, a communications officer activated the
IP Interoperability and Collaboration System
and bridged communication networks across
all agencies (Kanowitz 2016). Interoperability
was also provided through officers’ smart
phones which received bulk message texts via
a private messaging service (IIR 2015, 106) and
likely allowed the sharing of maps, photos, and
videos among officers in the streets and command center.

Intelligence in Ferguson
Intelligence practices have also radically
changed. Today, police departments rely on in-
house intelligence units, new surveillance technologies, and cooperation among law enforcement across a national network of fusion
centers (IIR 2015; Gillham 2011; Narr et al.
2006). Ferguson police did not have an active
intelligence unit when the uprising began.
However, once the ICS protocol was initiated,
a joint intelligence unit was established to
monitor the civil disorder and related issues.
The unit drew officers and other resources from
the separate intelligence units of the SLCPD
and St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department,
the St. Louis Fusion Center, and the Missouri
State Fusion Center (IIR 2015, 82).
The quickly assembled intelligence unit was
able to gather event data as the protests mobilized and the disorders spread (IIR 2015, 129).
The intelligence unit relied on various local resources including local agency helicopters
equipped with the latest forward-looking infrared (FLIR) night vision and moving map technologies, undercover intelligence officers circulating among the crowds, and officers
tracking social media (St. Louis County Police
Department 2014, 19; IIR 2015, 82, 101). Much
of this locally based intelligence gathering was
conducted using “new surveillance technologies” (Marx 2002, 2016), such as Geofeedia, a
surveillance platform that links social media
posts with the location of the posting. Geofeedia showed the intelligence unit the exact locations of the worst disorder from pictures and
video posted by protesters (Ozer 2016).
The joint intelligence unit also relied on outside assistance. FBI aerial surveillance pinpointed the location of fires and where people
were gathered (Tucker 2015). National law enforcement and private sector analysts provided
the intelligence unit “information through diverse intelligence information systems” (IIR
2015, 83), including the hub-and-spoke network
of seventy-eight fusion centers distributed nationwide (82).
Although secrecy surrounding a sensitive
topic inhibits a full understanding of where information came from and how it was used internally, the public information officer used
some information to counter rumors and pro-
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tester narratives of events, and to portray police
in a positive light (IIR 2015). The use of public
information officers in these ways is a common
national practice (Gillham, Edwards, and
Noakes 2013; Narr et al. 2006). The surveillance
and information acquisition and sharing capacity has expanded significantly since the 1960s.
Self-protection Equipment in Ferguson
Police involved in management of the Ferguson
disorder were well equipped in protective gear
relative to the 1960s (see table 2). Line officers
in Ferguson wore their regular duty uniforms
and Kevlar vests and were issued protective
equipment depending on the officer assignment. Agents policing the most disorderly locations (such as the SLCPD and Missouri State
Highway Patrol) had helmets, handheld
shields, face shields, and gas masks (IIR 2015,
57). More visually and technically striking was
the protective gear worn by tactical officers:
“battle dress uniforms,” some in camouflage,
military boots, utility belts and web guns, Kevlar helmets with night vision equipment, goggles, gasmasks, “level-three heavy vests,” and
some body armor. They also had available armored vehicles for safe transit and to extract
officers and injured citizens from volatile settings (IIR 2015; Pickler 2015; Belmar and Klein
knecht 2016).
Control Equipment in Ferguson
The range of mid-level weapons that augmented officers’ batons and service revolvers
contrasted markedly with the 1960s. Line officers and tactical units had electronic control
weapons such as Tasers and an arsenal of various projectiles, which had varying levels of impact on their human targets. Less painful and
less likely to cause serious injury were hand-
thrown Stingerball devices that released rubber
balls and pyrotechnic fire and sounds. More
painful and likely to injure people were bean
bag rounds fired from shotguns, and PepperBall rounds and wooden batons both fired from
handheld launchers. Smoke canisters were
fired to disorient people in the streets, break
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up groups, and assess wind direction before
deploying tear gas (IIR 2015, 46–49).
Police had more than mid-level weapons
available, however. Tactical units relied heavily
on military-grade equipment and techniques.
They carried automatic rifles, had strapped to
their vests high-capacity magazines containing
one to two hundred rounds of ammunition for
their weapons, and used armored vehicles to
disperse crowds (IIR 2015). The Lenco Bearcat,
a close cousin to the U.S. military mine-resistant,
ambush-protected vehicle, was the most prominent type of armored vehicle deployed. The
SLCPD’s Bearcat was twenty feet long and ten
feet wide, weighed eighteen thousand pounds,
and had an elevated platform that would allow
access to the third floor of a building (Lenco
2014; Belmar and Kleinknecht 2016, 36). Tactical
officers used the platform to post lookouts and
snipers who pointed their rifles at people in the
crowd while using their high-powered sights to
search for people with weapons (IIR 2015). Attached to the Bearcat was a military long-range
acoustical device or “sound cannon,” which
would transmit verbal announcements or warnings across long distances or high-pitched, ear-
damaging tones to disperse crowds.
Institutional Forces of Change

Several institutional forces contributed to these
organizational and technological response
changes. Closely connected to the Kerner Commission recommendations was creation of the
National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to research
and standardize police equipment and technologies. Another important set of institutional
forces link to the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). These include requirements
that law enforcement agencies receiving federal
grants must adopt the ICS framework, creation
of the fusion center network, and the establishment of antiterrorism grant programs.4
National Institute of Justice and
Development of Police Technologies
The various mid-level weapons and communication and surveillance technologies available

4. Space limitations prevent us from elaborating on other similar institutional forces including the rise of paramilitary police units and the Department of Defense 1033 Program that leases military equipment to local law
enforcement agencies (see Kraska and Cubellis 1997; Kraska and Kappeler 1997; Balko 2013; Wood 2014).
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to law enforcement in Ferguson and nationally
were developed with assistance from the NIJ,
the research branch of the U.S. Department of
Justice. The NIJ was formed in 1969 following
recommendations made by President Johnson’s 1966 Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice and the Kerner
Commission report. A central purpose of the
NIJ was to promote the innovation and adoption of police technologies used to manage protest and disorder (National Institute of Justice
1994, 10, 44.).
The NIJ promoted this innovation and adoption through four mechanisms. First, in the
early 1970s, the Institute developed the Police
Weapons System Program to assess “policies
and practices in the acquisition and use of offensive and defensive weapons by law enforcement” and evaluated existing police weapons
systems not yet widely adopted (1994, 45). Second, simultaneously it launched the Law Enforcement Standards Laboratory with the dual
purpose of establishing “scientifically based,
voluntary commercial manufacturing standards” and certifying a nationwide network of
“laboratories where equipment items could be
evaluated according to those standards” (45).
By 1975, the laboratory had developed performance standards for technologies recommended by the Kerner report including portable radios and defensive gear such as riot
helmets, light weight body armor, and ballistic
shields. Over the years, the NIJ has continued
to update these standards, including for new
surveillance technologies (National Institute of
Justice 1994; Nunn 2001).
Third, the NIJ provided research grants to
improve existing weapons and develop new
ones. These grants were distributed through
projects such as the Less-Lethal Technologies
Program started in 1986, and Joint Non-Lethal
Weapons Program started in 1996 (Wood 2014).
Through these grants, less-lethal products such
as pepper spray and adjustable-velocity projectile launchers were developed (National Insti-

tute of Justice 1994, 52). Fourth, the NIJ joined
with universities and the private sector to disseminate knowledge about these technologies
through commercial trade journals, trade
shows that coincided with police conventions,
and guides for less-lethal weapons (Weapons
and Protective Systems Technologies Center
2010; Wood 2014).
By the time of the Ferguson protests, a market had been created whereby law enforcement
agencies across the country could find powerful and affordable middle-range weapons and
other technologies (Wood 2014; Balko 2013).
Department of Homeland Security and Change
The DHS, created in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has been
responsible for three other institutional forces
that have shaped law enforcement’s adoption
of the ICS framework and new technologies
used in response to protest and civil disorder.
The first is the requirement that state and local
agencies who receive federal grants must adopt
FEMA ICS protocols.
The ICS structure was initially developed by
the U.S. Forest Service and supporting state and
local agencies in reaction to several organizational problems encountered by first responders during catastrophic wildfires in California
in 1970 (Chase 1980).5 After the Forest Service
and other fire agencies adopted the ICS framework, FEMA adopted ICS as a best practice and
recommended that other first responder agencies, including law enforcement, do the same
(Cardwell and Cooney 2000). However, most
law enforcement agencies were slow to adopt
ICS (Cardwell and Cooney 2000; Buck, Trainor,
and Aguirre 2006).
After establishing the DHS, President
George W. Bush directed state and local agencies that receive federal grant funds, including
law enforcement agencies, to adopt FEMA’s ICS
approach for managing emergencies.6 Today,
as a consequence of this directive, most law
enforcement departments have adopted a

5. These problems (similar to the organizational planning problems identified in the Kerner report) included
“overloaded spans of control . . . , lack of reliable information, inadequate and incompatible communication, . . .
and unclear lines of authority” (Lutz and Lindell 2008, 123).
6. HSPD-5, Directive on Management of Domestic Incidents, February 28, 2003 (accessed May 4, 2018, https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Homeland%20Security%20Presidential%20Directive%205.pdf).
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FEMA modeled ICS for responding in emergency situations, including situations like the
civil disorder that broke out in Ferguson (IIR
2015).
Another DHS-related institutional force was
the establishment of a national fusion center
network. Fusion centers, paid for with post-9/11
federal grants, are charged with receiving, analyzing, gathering, and sharing threat-related
information across federal, state, local, tribal,
territorial, and private-sector partners (DHS
2017). Analysts in local or state fusion centers
send information to other centers and to the
central DHS watch center (DHS 2017). As noted
in our case, this network provided vital information to the Ferguson intelligence unit as
they have to local police agencies responding
to other recent protests and disorders (Gillham,
Edwards, and Noakes 2013; Police Executive Research Forum 2015; Meyer 2017).
A final institutional force is DHS grants provided to law enforcement agencies for national
security. Since 2003, Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) grants have provided more than
$500 million annually to the largest metropolitan areas in the United States, enabling police
to acquire military equipment and less-lethal
weapons (Balko 2013; DHS 2014; IIR 2015, 58).
These funds are intended to “address the
unique planning, organization, equipment,
training, and exercise needs of high-threat,
high-density urban areas, and assists them in
building an enhanced and sustainable capacity
to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism” (FEMA 2010, 2).
But these funds pay for equipment used for
more than anti-terrorism measures. The SLCPD
used UASI grants to purchase their Bearcat,
protective gear, and less-lethal weapons used
during the Ferguson unrest (Belmar and
Kleinknecht 2016; IIR 2015).
In sum, the provision of federal resources
and funding requirements helped standardize
practices, improved communication across
agencies, and provided support for new practices and technologies unlikely to be locally
funded. Clearly, in important ways the policing
of protest has dramatically changed since
Kerner. Next, we consider what worked and
what did not work as a consequence of the described changes.
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How M a n y C h e e r s ? So m e I m pac t s i n
Fe r g u s o n a n d B e yo n d

Besides organizational and technical changes,
we note changes in police culture, specifically,
better empirical understanding of crowd behavior and the rights of citizens. In many cases
this has resulted in a softening of, and greater
differentiation in, police responses, even as this
brings risks of under-reaction. Yet simultaneously some law and order responses to crowds
have hardened, bringing risks of over-reaction
(for example, blurring the lines between local
police and the military with respect to available
tools, tactics, and cooperation).
Given the vast time period and significant
variation across places and types of events any
conclusions about consequences of “what
worked and what has not worked since Kerner?”
must be tentative. Furthermore, any consideration of what works in the context of a semi-
secret institution with unique powers of coercion charged with maintaining an unequal
status quo must be qualified more than for
other less adversarial institutions. Yet, some
broader conclusions can be drawn from the
Ferguson case with respect to current police
command and control systems, intelligence
practices, and equipment (see table 3).
The organizational and equipment changes
seen in Ferguson were not accompanied by civilian or police fatalities. As noted in table 3,
policing practices employed during Ferguson
worked in some ways to deal with issues raised
by the Kerner Commission (such as rapid mobilization, clearer chain of command, improved
communication within and between agencies
and officers, dispelling of rumors through public information officers, better intelligence during events, safety equipment, use of less-lethal
weapons).
Yet, paradoxically, these practices can be accompanied by ironic or unforeseen consequences. Consider the ways local police have
become more militarized—a factor the Kerner
report clearly warned against. Although increasing militarization provides protective
equipment for police and superior force to potentially deter violent assaults against police or
others, it can also reinforce feelings of fear and
anger and the view that police are an occupying army rather a public force that protects and
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Table 3. Police Command and Control System, Intelligence Practices, and Protective and Control
Equipment Used in Ferguson in 2014

Command and
control system
1000 Plan/ICS Plan

RIOT radio frequency,
portable radios, cell
phones, and text
messaging

Worked

Did Not Work

Provided efficient mechanism to
rapidly mobilize officers from
multiple agencies
Established clear chain of command
for decision-making,
communicating orders, and
communicating with public to
dispel rumors

Drew self-deploying officers
undertrained in disorder control
and without direct supervision
Incident commander communicated
orders inconsistently resulting in
contradictory and underenforcement that escalated
disorder
Misinformation provided in cigar
video inflamed community
members and escalated disorder
Closed communications minimized
public transparency about police
actions

Facilitated efficient and closed
communication between officers
Prevented communication system
overload

Intelligence practices
Local intelligence unit Used extensive in-house surveillance
and analytic tools to gather and
with extensive
analyze multiple sources and large
in-house surveillance
amounts of static and real-time
and analytic tools
information; able to quickly assess
available
risk and respond, and to collect
evidence for prosecution
National fusion center Used extensive national surveillance
and analytic tools to gather and
network
analyze multiple sources and large
amounts of static and real-time
information; able to inform
Ferguson intelligence unit about
events there and potential outsider
threats
Control equipment
and techniques
Self-protection
Minimized individual injury to
officers in the field
equipment
Display of firepower may have
Deployment of milideterred some disorder; armored
tary grade equipvehicles provided way to extract
ment
officers and injured protesters from
volatile settings
Use of less-lethal
Prevented deaths and reduced
incident of serious injuries
weapons

Revealed extent of national
surveillance system with capacity
to violate privacy rights; created
distrust and chilled protest

Revealed extent of national
surveillance system with capacity
to violate privacy rights; created
distrust and chilled protest

Distanced officers from community
members, chilled protest
Frightened and angered community
members, delegitimized police in
local communities and nationally,
may have escalated disorder, risk of
mass fatalities
Frightened and angered community
members, delegitimized police in
local communities and nationally,
more people affected by police use
of force, may have escalated disorder

Source: Authors’ tabulations.
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serves its community. First Amendment activities may be chilled, already damaged relations
may be worsened, and police further delegitimized. If disorder persists, a militarized force
can attract more people into the streets out of
curiosity, excitement, or anger (Gillham and
Marx 2000). Another risk is that officers armed
with automatic weapons might inadvertently
kill many citizens or other officers.
Less-lethal weapons also raise questions. In
Ferguson, the police use of less-lethal weapons
might have prevented fatalities. Yet the methods were controversial. Police claimed they
used tear gas to disperse crowds. But complaints were lodged that police used it to punish protesters, gave either no or inadequate
warnings to disperse before using, and gas
seeped into adjacent homes (IIR 2015, 49–51).
As is true of military-grade equipment, the use
of less-lethal weapons worked in some ways,
even as it created problems. The question of
what worked and what did not is in many ways
a question of the trade-offs, paradoxes, and ironies inherent in any intervention in complex
social environments.
Implications for the Twenty-First Century

We conclude with two sets of issues—one empirical and one evaluative to address a final
question: What are the implications of changes
in policing of disorder for a democratic American society in the twenty-first century?
Empirical Issues
Social scientists generally have a terrible reputation for predicting the future. Thus, a note
of caution is needed regarding sweeping conclusions and predictions about the trends we
identified. It is too easy to assume that the
patterns from the past will be present in the
future, or, if they are, that they will be found in
the same ratios and be accounted for by the
same causal factors as previously. In the research presented here, any conclusions must
be tempered by the fact that there is an always
evolving, dynamic, and fluid conflictual dance
between police and those involved in protest
and disorder (Gillham and Marx 2000). But,
holding apart questions about trying to predict the future, we build off Marx’s (1998) earlier reflections on the developing ethos of U.S.
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policing since the late 1960s to draw some empirical conclusions relevant for today (see table 4).
In the decades since Kerner, rather than taking an explicitly adversarial and intentionally
violent approach specifically against protests,
police have often sought a more velvet-gloved,
neutral, measured stance, even as the nearby,
out of sight, iron fist of the National Guard,
military, and hardware with varying degrees of
lethality could be quickly mobilized. The policing of protest has thus become more accepted
and better understood as a routine part of local
policing. Although the police hardly welcome
them, mass demonstrations today in general
no longer arouse the hostility or fear they previously did. Yet large-scale disorders that spill
out of protests like that in Ferguson still create
conditions where police may react in ways that
violate civil liberties, have a chilling effect on
nonviolent protest, and escalate disorders, just
as they did in the 1960s and historically,
whether the issue was race or unions.
But today law enforcement is less quick to
automatically categorize all those in the streets
as riffraff, criminals, rebellious adolescents,
manipulated students, or agents of a foreign
power. Rather, they are often seen as citizens
with rights, though they are expected to keep
their disorder within bounds. More than in the
1960s, police view their job to be managing
rather than repressing protest, protecting the
right to demonstrate and guaranteeing due process of law and to use a minimum amount of
force to restore order (even to those whose
views they may find intolerable). The presence
of video, cell phone cameras, and body cameras, with their potential for accountability can
support this.
Exceptions to this trend are numerous (see
note 1). The pattern of police pacification itself
involves a series of interrelated developments
and may not continue in the face of wrenching social changes or widespread social unrest. Nor is it unilateral across dimensions,
groups, or contexts—as any venture into marginalized, ethnically diverse, lower-income areas or discussions with those who have had
their rights violated and their bodies assaulted
can attest (Wood 2007). But viewed in comparative and historical terms in which the
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Table 4. The Evolving Ethos of the Policing of Protests and Civil Disorders in the United States
Since 1967
1. Police are servants of the law rather than the private army of whoever happens to be in power.
2. Law and policy are extended to tactics that had once been ignored and unregulated.
3. The law must be viewed flexibly, and a broad pragmatic view of the likely consequences of police
action needs to be taken.
4. The primary goal of police in conventional crowd situations is to manage them to see that they do
not get out of hand.
5. Emphasis is on prevention rather than responding after the fact.
6. A coproduction of order should involve a decentralized and delegated reliance on citizens to
enforce the law and to control themselves.
7. Emphasis is placed on science and technology involving, first, efforts to engineer physical and
social environments while minimizing to the extent possible the militarization of local police or
using a technical method simply because it is available, and, second, relatively dispassionate
intelligence gathering and analysis. Information technology is central to police managing
information about police themselves, events, and protesters.
8. Efforts are made to learn from past events to be better prepared the next time, yet with flexibility,
avoiding being rigidly captured by current en vogue doctrines.
9. The federal leadership role is stronger from the start. This involves an effort to develop uniform
approaches across soft as well as hard police methods; to increase communication, integration, and
cooperation to create more uniform, standardized operations and procedures across local, state, and
federal authorities; and to create national standards and best practices.
10. Police are more militarized, particularly with regards to equipment. Logistical, organizational, and
communication borders between local, regional, and state control agencies, and between them and
the military, are weaker.
Source: Authors’ tabulations (adapted from Marx 1998).
Note: Italicized text are additions.

standard police response was, and in many
countries still is, to prohibit demonstrations
or to fire or charge into crowds, the trends
matter. The ethos of demonstration policing
Marx saw thirty years after Kerner, holds, if
with some changes in 2018 (Marx 1998; see table 4 and appendix).
Moral and Political Issues
Apart from what can be seen or empirically
demonstrated are questions of interpretation
involving moral and political judgments. With
respect to the latter, what can be said about the
impact of more controlled (and what are seen
conventionally to be effective) police responses? We need to ask effective for whom
and by what standards?
How should we judge developments in the

management of disorders? Is law enforcement’s ability to avoid killing protesters in
the streets or to intervene preventively a sign
of progress? Is this a cause for some modest
celebration, or at least appreciation? Certainly, the avoidance of provocation, injury
or loss of life, cities on fire, and escalation,
as well as decreasing hatred and alienation
are positive. Full-scale riots leave deep reservoirs of bitterness on all sides and are conducive to backlash and draconian policies.
We saw that clearly with the backlash and
weakening of the civil rights movement related to Nixon’s presidency. It is hard to see
who really profited from the prolonged 1960s
disorders. It is much easier to see short-r un
costs (Shellow et al. 2018).7
The development of a more pacific, demo-

7. Rob Shellow and his colleagues note how outcomes varied in the short run aftermath by city characteristics
and type of event.
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cratic policing ethos is not without contradictions, challenges, risks and trade-offs relative
to other models (Marx 1988; Gillham and Marx
2000). As noted earlier, we need to ask what
does it mean to say that a police response
works? With health care or schools, we seek
maximum effectiveness. But for police in a democratic society we need optimal (rather than
maximal) effectiveness. Practices must be continually reexamined given changing conditions,
tactics, and actors. In the case of efforts to create more professional police and to regulate
discretion in crowd situations, the challenge is
in finding the right mix such that honoring discretion does not put police beyond the law and
responsible political control, and that regulating discretion does not introduce undue rigidity. Order needs to be maintained and the law
(with its vagaries and conflicts) followed, but
not at great cost to citizens’ rights, the elimination of protest as a tool for social change, or
the permanent institutionalization of strong
control responses temporarily created and justified by a major crisis (such as 9/11). In such
cases, strong oversight and renewal procedures
are necessary to keep responses measured and
proportionate.
There is no guarantee that the enhancements of police powers relative to crowds will
be used to protect, rather than to undermine
democracy. A democratic society must continually ask the question, “how efficient do we
want police to be?” Democratic societies have
traditionally been willing to sacrifice a degree
of order for increased liberty, but not in times
of crisis. At such times the danger of a creeping
(or galloping) downhill spiral is ever present.
When liberty is reduced on behalf of order,
transparency is particularly important, as is
avoiding the risk of artificially created or exaggerated crises to justify that sacrifice.
We can ask that a bandage or pain reliever
do its job and certainly not make an injury
worse, even as it is not a cure. President Johnson’s charge to the commission was muddied
regarding the link between his three often-
cited questions (“what happened, why did it
happen and what can be done to prevent it
happening again”). The it was taken to mean
riot stoppage. But what was really needed was
a fourth question separating it as riot control
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from it as racial injustice (Marx 1970b, 2018).
What it takes to prevent or stop a civil disorder
is distinct (other than the issue of police abuse
that can precipitate and contribute to disorder)
from changes in economic and political opportunity, education, housing, health, and the
many other factors related to inequality that
propel disorders.
Improved and more effective police responses can often stop disorders from escalating. But to the extent that they are unfairly repressive and deter legitimate protest, they may
deepen racial injustice and the anger and despair that help fuel disorders.
Democratic societies experience a continual
tension between the desire for order and the
desire for liberty. Although, as the case of the
police state suggests, one can have the former
without the latter, it is not possible to have a
society with liberty that does not also have a
minimum degree of order. The balance between these will vary depending on the context
and time period. Policing in a democracy seeks
to avoid the extremes of either anarchy or repression.
In an open democratic society that respects
the dignity of the individual and values voluntary and consensual behavior and the nonviolent resolution of conflicts, police—with their
power, secrecy, and use of violence and deception—are an anomaly. They are charged with
using undemocratic means to help create democratic ends. Police offer an ethical and moral
paradox that should forever make democratic
citizens vigilant.
This paradox is evident in the fact that a
democratic society needs protection both by
police and from police. Restrictions on police
power are not an adequate guarantee of freedom. Taken too far, they may even guarantee
its opposite, as private interests reign unchecked or citizens take the law into their own
hands in the face of increased disorder, or
both. Yet a police force with too much power
is also a danger. President Abraham Lincoln
posed the dilemma well when he asked, “must
a government, of necessity, be too strong for
the liberties of its’ own people, or too weak to
maintain its’ existence?” This paradox remains
one of the major challenges of democratic governance.
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A p p e n d i x : Wo r k i n g f o r t h e
Kerner Commission and
R e l at e d R e flec t i o n s

Gary T. Marx had the good fortune to work for
the commission as part of a research group led
by Rob Shellow and studied police behavior
and types of disorder. When the Kerner Commission studied questions of the police and
civil disorders, very little social science research had been undertaken to inform the analysis; the dominant control ethos was a hard-
line, law and order approach in a context of a
decentralized federal law enforcement system.
Marx describes the experience of working
for the commission and on a suppressed report
The Harvest of Racism (2018; Shellow et al. 2018),
published on the fiftieth anniversary of its writing. For Marx, the focus on these issues helped
define over five decades of scholarly work. The
chance to work on these questions at the beginning of a career with the abundant resources,
legitimation, and access of a national commission was most fortuitous and sustaining. That
experience provided data, research questions,
and scholarly connections that lasted a lifetime
on topics such as police behavior in riots and
intelligence gathering, types of riot, counter-
rioters and community police patrols, the implications of the minority or majority group
identity of activists and researchers, and, more
broadly the study of social movements and
mass behavior and of the requisites for social
order (Marx 1970a, 1970b, 1971a, 1971b, 1974,
1988, 1998, 2002, 2016; Marx and Archer 1971;
Marx and Useem 1971; Marx and McAdam 1994;
Gillham and Marx 2000, 2003).
Working for the Kerner Commission sensitized Marx to the importance and neglect of
the softer ethos as applied to crowds. The importance of this was heightened in a candid
conversation with a high-ranking member of
the Chicago Police Department shortly after
the police violence during the 1968 Democratic
Convention. The commander indicated how
unprofessional his department had behaved.
He said that as a commander in a protest situation he is willing to listen, to negotiate, to tolerate minor infractions, and to keep a low profile. He felt strongly that saving lives should be
more important than protecting property or
symbols. He believed that demonstrations

could actively help create, rather than undermine, political stability (at least relative to not
permitting or responding violently to them).
The extensive media coverage of Chicago police
attacking protesters was a public relations disaster and such behavior made the police job
much more difficult. At the time, his views were
heretical and he left the police soon after, but
in the decades since they have become more
widely shared among major police leaders in
the United States. The management of disorders continues to evolve.
How control agents frame events bears directly on control responses. If they are defined
as (or only as) violations of law and order and
the criminal code, then hard repression is the
more likely response. If, in contrast, they are
also seen as connected to understandable protests because grievances are present (apart
from whether police are in sympathy with
these) or because citizen’s have the right to express their concerns, then a soft communications approach, particularly at the outset, is
more likely (Tilly 2000; Gillham and Noakes
2007). Adopting either approach to the exclusion of the other brings risks of unwanted under-or overreaction.
Apart from the institutional and cultural factors discussed in the article, the greater prominence of softer approaches is likely tied to a
shift from the late 1960s to the present in the
ratio of non- or less focused crowd-protest
events to ones where a protest theme is more
directly in evidence. A conflict is also possible
in the communications offered the public by
police and political leaders, versus that coming
from protest groups. For the former, the tilt is
toward a definition of disorder and criminal
behavior; for the latter, it is toward a protest
definition. Within these groups are conflicts as
well, control groups divided over soft and hard
approaches and protest groups divided between orderly disorder (to coin a phrase) and
random destruction and assaults (favored by
fringe groups).
The social and psychological characteristics
and location of control agents are related to
such definitions, but more objective characteristics also are likely to be. Thus the presence
of a widely shared belief among those in the
streets that direct action is needed to call at-
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tention to a problem, within a context of an
ongoing political dispute and a planned event
whose organizers go through a permitting process are likely to be differentiated from spontaneous, less organized, or unorganized gatherings that have no clear leader or group to
communicate with, nor a specific precipitating
event (Gillham and Noakes 2007). Marx considers these and other factors in seeking objective
measures for how events are likely to be labeled
as either protest or disorder (1970a). However,
because events often show much internal variation (by types of participant, activities, places,
and times within the event) rarely will an event
approach the ideal type at either end of the
continuum.
The views expressed by the officer mentioned contrast markedly with those found in
totalitarian regimes, which blur or erase the
line between politics and crime. Any oppositional politics is defined as crime. But they also
contrast with the creation of the first modern
police department in Paris at the end of the
seventeenth century in which the protection of
public order was also equated with the protection of the political order. Indeed, for many observers the connection has been reversed. That
is, protecting the right to protest against the
political order is defined as the best way of protecting it—at least if the political order is
broadly defined to involve a set of democratic
principles, rather than the particular persons
or groups in power. The conditions under
which democracies can accept nonelectoral political challenges and yet remain democracies
is an issue of enduring importance. As James
Madison observed, “you must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the
next place, oblige it to control itself.”
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